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Abstract
This article will examine the transnational practices of the 
Eritrean government, and their impact on the settlement 
of Eritrean refugees in Canada. The focus is on actions by 
the Eritrean regime that have a negative effect on refugees’ 
capacities for successful integration, and undermine Cana-
dian sovereignty. The concept of coercive transnational 
governance (CTG) is introduced, to highlight this neglected 
aspect of refugee resettlement, with illustrations from 11 
interviews, including eight Eritrean refugees, one Eritrean 
community activist, and two Canadian law enforcement 
officers, about the impact of CTG on Eritrean refugees’ lives. 
Résumé
Cet article examine les pratiques transnationales du gouver-
nement d’Érythrée et leurs conséquences sur l’établissement 
de réfugiés érythréens au Canada. Il est centré sur les actions 
du régime érythréen qui ont des conséquences négatives sur 
les capacités des réfugiés à réussir leur intégration et affai-
blissent la souveraineté canadienne. Pour souligner cette 
perspective négligée de la réinstallation des réfugiés, il intro-
duit le concept de Gouvernance transnationale coercitive 
(GTC), qu’il illustre à l’aide de 11 entretiens, parmi lesquels 
huit entretiens avec des réfugiés érythréens, un entretien 
avec un activiste de la communauté érythréenne, et deux 
entretiens avec des agents canadiens chargés de l’application 
de la loi, et il envisage les répercussions de la GTC sur la vie 
des réfugiés érythréens.
Introduction
Canada has been a safe haven for thousands of refu-gees who have fled dictatorial regimes in their home countries. It is in the interest of the Canadian gov-
ernment to create a secure system to protect refugees and 
ensure that their integration process moves smoothly, and 
that they overcome their challenges. While language barri-
ers, unemployment, and lack of recognition of international 
credentials are the most-discussed obstacles to refugees’ 
integration, the security challenges facing refugees have not 
received the attention they deserve. Intimidation, threats, 
and surveillance of refugees are some of them.2 They put the 
peace and mental stability of some refugees at risk and delay 
their integration. The case of Eritrean migrants is a good 
example. This focus on Canada is particularly important, 
given the official critical position of the Canadian govern-
ment toward the current Eritrean government, expressed in 
its support for the United Nations Security Council sanc-
tions toward Eritrea, and Resolution 2023 (2011), for Eritrea 
to “cease using threats of violence, fraud and other illicit 
means to collect taxes outside of Eritrea.”3 This affirmation 
to uphold international decrees also calls for attention to the 
conditions for refugees who have been granted asylum in 
Canada.
Eritreans have been dispersed from their home country 
as a result of colonial aggression from 1890 to 1991, and 
the struggle against Ethiopia from 1961 to 1991, which 
contributed to the emigration of more than half a million 
people.4 The resettlement of Eritreans in Canada started in 
the early 1980s5 and continued to grow after Eritrea became 
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independent. They, like many African immigrants, have 
experienced challenges during their settlement process, 
including discrimination in accessing employment, finding 
a place to live, and mastering the official languages.6 How-
ever, their settlement experience is unique because their 
challenges come not only from the host society but also from 
the government of their home country. Additionally, while 
the literature on Eritrean transnationalism is focused on the 
conditions in Eritrea itself,7 our research brings a missing 
element in addressing the conditions of settlement in coun-
tries of arrival. 
Transnational Governance
The term transnational governance became prominent in the 
twentieth century before the world grasped the change as an 
alternative to globalization. According to Djelic and Sahlin-
Andersson, the words do not convey the same meaning: 
globalization is used to describe the activities done across 
geographical borders, while transnational governance is an 
integral part of geopolitical administration and the practices 
of a number of global institutions.8 In sum, “Governance 
beyond the nation state means creating political order in the 
absence of a state with a legitimate monopoly over the use 
of force and the capacity to enforce the law and other rules 
authoritatively.”9 It includes the ways a government governs 
its citizens beyond the geographic boundaries of its jurisdic-
tion. However, this should not imply the “disappearance of 
nation-states,”10 or the undermining of international institu-
tions that govern their activities without the interference of 
the states,11 though it can erode territorial boundaries and 
blur standard regulations. 
With the expansion of transnationalism, a number of 
regulations emerged globally. Baldwin, Scott, and Hood 
categorize three types of regulations: authoritative rules, 
efforts to steer the economy, and means of social control.12 
Therefore transnational regulation as a concept is a form of 
“governance in the sense that it structures, guides and con-
trols human and social activities and interactions beyond, 
across and within national territories.”13 Such practices are 
documented, e.g., for Haiti.14 Some authoritarian countries, 
usually with high emigration, apply a diverse range of mech-
anisms to engage their diasporas for financial extraction.15 
In Eritrea, the government retaliates against the families of 
exiled members by forcing them to pay a fine or face time in 
prison, and uses its institutions abroad to maintain political 
control and governance through fear from a distance.16 Or 
as Hepner articulates it, the Eritrean government interferes 
aggressively in the life of the Eritrean diaspora to be in com-
mand of their transnational activities.17 While coercive prac-
tices are documented in other countries, and there has been 
scant media attention to the issue, ours is the first Canadian 
study to rely on interviews of Eritrean refugees about their 
experiences of transnational governance.
In the era of transnationalism, Aihwa Ong articulates the 
capacity of the nation-state to control its citizens wherever 
they are by using law, economy, and social apparatuses.18 For 
instance, some countries sign bilateral tax agreements and 
they cooperate with each other in taxing their citizens who 
live abroad. Such agreements can prevent citizens from dou-
ble taxation19 or eliminate tax competition.20 This type of 
transnational governance is done with the common under-
standing of both parties, and it may not create discomfort for 
their citizens.
To build on these analyses, we are introducing the new 
concept of coercive transnational governance (CTG) to 
describe what is practised outside of bilateral or multina-
tional agreements without the knowledge of any other gov-
ernments. CTG is a form of governance used by dictatorial 
regimes to maintain political control and secure financial 
contributions by force from their citizens who settled in 
the Western world as refugees. Refugee-sending countries 
practise CTGto exploit the wealth and resources of their 
transnational citizens through force or providing mandatory 
incentives to obtain necessary documents and to ensure the 
safety of family members still living in or attempting to leave 
the sending country. CTG has exacerbated the settlement 
challenges of Eritrean-Canadians for over a decade.
Indeed, the literature describes how the Eritrean state 
uses its transnational institutions not to cultivate the socio-
political activities of its people or to enable their influence in 
the foreign world, but to restrict their activities, control their 
influence, and make them obedient to the regime.21 
The Eritrean regime suppresses basic human rights and 
liberties by restricting travel and prohibiting political oppo-
sition, independent media, faith groups, or community 
organizations inside its borders.22 Additionally, the Eritrean 
state controls the lives of its citizens outside the country by 
installing undercover representatives in every community 
event, gathering, or association,23 creating a “climate of 
fear.”24 Significantly, Eritrean embassy and consulate offi-
cials in European and North American countries collect an 
involuntary 2 per cent income tax from Eritreans who work 
abroad,25 described as a “rehabilitation and recovery tax” 
(mehwey gibri).26 Such payments also affect the Eritreans 
who work in Middle Eastern countries, as they are required 
to have a valid passport to get a work permit.27 The Eritrean 
government takes advantage of the situation and dictates 
that they must not only pay the 2 per cent tax, but also 
donate money to the Hidri Trust Fund28 (which is owned 
by the ruling party) in order to obtain a passport. Those 
people have no other option(s); their residency in countries 
like Saudi Arabia depends on having a work permit, but the 
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governments of Middle Eastern countries do not interfere 
in the business of the Eritrean government, even though 
they know how the Eritrean government exploits its citizens 
inside their countries.
That is not an issue in Canada, but still the only office 
that represents the Eritrean government in Canada, the 
Eritrean consulate, uses extortion, threats of violence, and 
other illegal means to collect the 2 per cent income taxes 
from Eritrean-Canadians. Most are forced to pay because 
the government will not honour their request for passports 
or any other vital documents that can assist them to obtain 
permanent resident status in Canada. Even those who do 
not request any documents and refuse to pay the 2 per cent 
income tax are intimidated by agents of the regime. These 
immigrants are warned to do it for the sake of their families 
in Eritrea.29 Eritrean refugees who have not paid the tax have 
experienced obstacles in sponsoring their family members 
from their home country,30 or in obtaining educational doc-
umentation.31 Hundreds of millions of dollars are extorted 
each year in this way and are estimated to amount to 30–35 
per cent of the GDP of Eritrea.32 
Those who pay the tax violate international and Canadian 
laws that prohibit monetary assistance to support military 
activities.33 In May 2013, following years of complaints from 
members of the Eritrean community, the consul general of 
Eritrea was expelled after he ignored Canada’s warning to 
stop soliciting money from the Eritrean diaspora for military 
and other purposes.34 
Background to Eritrean Migrant and Refugee 
Flows
Eritrea was a colony of Italy, Britain, and Ethiopia from 1890 
to 1991 and experienced large-scale emigration by opponents 
of colonial rule.35 As a result, about one-fourth of Eritrea’s six 
million people still live in exile. After Eritrea’s independence 
in 1991, the number of people who fled the country increased 
in response to gross human rights violations, forced labour, 
brutal administration, and a system of “ruthless repression” 
and “pervasive state control.”36 During the 30-year revolu-
tionary struggle of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front 
(EPLF) from 1961 to 1991, about one million people escaped 
and ended up in refugee camps or were prevented from 
returning home.37 
The Eritrean diaspora in Canada began in the late 1970s to 
early 1980s.38 Wherever they settled, Eritrean refugees were 
organized and mobilized by the EPLF to play their part in the 
ongoing struggle for independence of their country. During 
those years the EPLF expanded its activities as a social and 
political organization among Eritreans abroad, organized the 
diasporas into chapters of the EPLF, and used its mass associa-
tions to channel and manage their support in the revolution.39 
Migration slowed after Eritrea became independent in 
1991, but the eruption of border conflicts with Ethiopia from 
1998 to 2000 and political instability throughout the country 
forced many citizens to flee. According to the 2013 report of 
UNHCR, about 4,000 Eritreans flee the country every month 
to escape merciless repression, persecution, and forced 
labour. 
Eritrea is a leading producer of refugees.40 There are no 
accurate data on Eritrean populations in host countries in 
North America and Europe,41 mostly because during regis-
tration they have been classified as “Ethiopians” instead of 
“Eritreans,” since most of them left the country before Eritrea’s 
independence in 1991.42 According to the 2011 Household 
Survey, 13,430 people reported Eritrean ancestry.43 However, 
according to community leaders, about 30,000 Eritreans live 
in Canada, the majority of them in Ontario. 
Research Design
Having identified and named the practice of coercive trans-
national governance (CTG), this article aims to investigate 
its impact on the settlement process of Eritreans in Canada. 
The goal was to conduct a pilot project, identifying themes 
for a future, larger-scale analysis. The project was unfunded, 
limiting the sample size and the generalizability of the data. 
Using maximum variation sampling,44 eight Eritrean 
refugees were recruited because they currently dealt or had 
dealt with the Eritrean consulate for services. Six of the refu-
gee participants were men and two were women. Four par-
ticipants were married and the rest were single during their 
encounter with the Eritrean consulate. There is variation 
in the types of services they requested. Additional recruits 
included one human rights activist who has been vocal 
about the issue for a number of years, and two law enforce-
ment authorities were also recruited for the relevance of their 
work in deterring organized crime. 
The recruitment poster for this research was circulated 
among the email group and Facebook page of the Eritrean 
community, and posters were distributed in Eritrean res-
taurants in Toronto. Moreover, a letter of invitation to par-
ticipate in the study was sent via email to 95 members of the 
primary investigator’s network. Participants’ desire to share 
their personal experience was overwhelming. No coercion 
was used. Eleven participants agreed and gave their writ-
ten consent for the interview and audio-recording, and the 
interviews were conducted accordingly.
This study posed semi-structured, open-ended questions 
about (1) challenges of Eritrean refugees in the settlement 
process; (2) activities of the Eritrean consulate within the 
expatriate community; and (3) access to local law enforce-
ment authorities in response to CTG actions of the consu-
late. The eight Eritrean participants were asked about their 
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resettlement experiences; the role of the Eritrean consulate 
in Toronto in their lives; the services requested or acquired 
from the consulate; the harassment or intimidation they 
experienced; whether they reported to police about coercion 
of the consulate; and recommendations on how to address/
solve this issue. The interview with the human rights activist 
focused on capturing his perspective on the obstacles facing 
Eritrean refugees during resettlement; the role of the Eri-
trean consulate in the life of Eritrean refugees; and whether 
the activist had attempted to disclose the problem and the 
challenges they face.
Since there is very little literature on the challenges of 
Eritrean refugees in Canada, and many of them do not share 
openly out of fear, a one-to-one interview with refugees is 
crucial to capturing the essence of their lived experiences. 
The participants were proficient in English, but the inter-
views were conducted in English or Tigrigna (whichever 
the participant chose). Most participants responded to the 
interview questions in writing, but follow-up questions were 
answered on the phone and audiotaped, with the participants’ 
consent.45 Each lasted 15 to 25 minutes and was conducted 
between August and October 2015. Those eight participants 
arrived in Canada from 1999 to 2008. Five had issues with 
Eritrean CTG in obtaining exit visas for their family to reu-
nite with them; two refugees had problems in renewing their 
expired passports, while the rest had difficulties in acquiring 
educational documents from Eritrea. In reporting the results, 
pseudonyms are used, to protect the identity of participants.
The results were analyzed using thematic coding,46 identi-
fying commonalities, differences, and relationships between 
sets of concepts and ideas.47 Specifically, themes were for-
mulated with a “prior-research driven method”48 arising 
from literature.
Research Findings
Given the small size of the sample, it was not possible to 
make conclusions about variation in responses in relation to 
their demographic differences such as gender, age, or length 
of stay in Canada. 
The interviews show that the readiness of the receiving 
society to accept refugees is crucial in determining whether 
those refugees will “sink or swim.”49 If they encounter obsta-
cles in the initial stages of their settlement, their integration 
could be hindered.50 Many of the participants reported chal-
lenges with getting refugee status or finding employment. 
However, most participants described the actions of their 
own government as the biggest barrier in their lives, through 
denial of passport renewals, exit visas to family members, 
birth certificates or original education documents, and 
interference in local community life. In the interviews, CTG 
was clearly found to create obstacles to Eritrean integration. 
They reported difficulties with their (1) finances and educa-
tion, and (2) family reunification, while they also (3) lived in 
fear and isolation, and (4) had issues reporting CTG abuses 
to authorities. 
Problems with Employment and Education
The community activist asserted that educational futures of 
refugees were seriously affected by inaccessibility to educa-
tional documents. Aida, a refugee woman who had arrived 
in Canada in 2004, told of how her plan to pursue higher 
education was delayed for about four years as a result of the 
obstacles of the Eritrean consulate in Toronto: “I was denied 
access to my own documents that I had worked hard for and 
earned.” 
Even with educational credentials, refugees have more 
difficulties accessing affordable places to live in and find-
ing well-paying jobs. As a result, their income is low and 
their stress level is high. They struggle to make ends meet 
for themselves “while sending provision abroad to support 
family members who have been left behind.”51 They are not 
only exposed to the common challenges of refugees in creat-
ing a secure income but are also forced to pay 2 per cent of 
their income to the Eritrean regime. This breaks the financial 
backbone of many refugees at the very beginning.
Samuel, who has been in Canada since 2007, was asked 
to pay 2 per cent of his income and other fees to get his 
educational documents from the University of Asmara. He 
said, “In general, I paid around $1,000 for the 2 per cent tax. 
Moreover, I didn’t have a stable job. As a newcomer, you 
don’t have any savings. Yet, you have to cover the grocery, 
rent, and everything you need for the baby. It was not easy.”
The activist provided an example of one refugee he 
assisted:
There was one Eritrean who came to Canada as a government-
sponsored refugee from a prison in Egypt. This guy left his wife 
and three children behind. He was getting some support from the 
Canadian government … At the time when he was trying to bring 
his children and his wife, he was asked to pay the 2 per cent tax. 
When the calculation of the 2 per cent tax came, even the time he 
had spent in Egypt was taken into consideration … To me, it is 
nonsense.
The second thing is at that time he himself was dependent on 
the Canadian government. In other words, your money and my 
money as taxpayers were taken away by the consulate. That’s what 
surprised me. 
Russom, who claimed asylum in 2001 and has lived in 
Canada since then, described his struggle elegantly. What 
surprised him most about the behaviour of the Eritrean 
consulate was their lack of consideration for disabled people 
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and individuals who live on social welfare. The office forced 
everyone to pay, regardless of the individuals’ situations. He 
stated, “I was helping myself because I didn’t have anyone 
to cook and clean my house, everything. So my cost was 
doubled like everyone else. They didn’t even consider my 
personal challenges as a disabled person. The consulate was 
looking after my money, not after me as a person or a citizen.” 
He was charged $5 a month for the two years (2001–3) when 
he was on social welfare and 2 per cent of his income for the 
few months that he had worked. “I know there are people 
who paid over $5,000 or $6,000 from their income. I was so 
lucky. My damage was not too much but still it was not legal.”
The inability to pay the extorted fees also creates difficul-
ties for mobility, further hindering people’s capacity to con-
duct their regular lives. Feruz, who left Eritrea legally to reu-
nite with her family in Canada in 2010, was denied renewal 
of her passport, simply because she rebuffed the 2 per cent 
tax: “So I applied to the Canadian government for a travel 
document. I explained to them that the Eritrean government 
refused to renew my passport unless I paid the 2 per cent tax 
on my income. Then they asked me to present a written legal 
document from the Eritrean government, saying that they 
had refused to renew my passport because of that. However, 
the Eritrean consulate didn’t want to give me a written docu-
ment, and the Canadian government didn’t understand. It 
was very challenging. 
This obstacles can be endured only by determined 
refugees who know how the system works—like Feruz—or 
refugees who are willing to pay the price. The lack of under-
standing by Canadian government departments of how the 
Eritrean regime mistreats refugees throws many newcomers 
into a suffocating situation. As a result, Eritrean refugees feel 
helpless and sometimes are forced to break Canadian law 
to fulfil requests by the Eritrean consulate to donate money 
for military activities, which is illegal under Canadian law 
(this payment would be in addition to the 2 per cent tax on 
income). This puts at stake the safety of refugees as well as 
the sovereignty of Canada. As long as the Canadian govern-
ment’s policy is not tailored to address the Eritrean refugees’ 
issues separately, their misery will continue and Canadian 
law will be challenged. 
Problems with Family Reunification
One major issue facing refugees is reuniting with family 
members they had to leave behind. This is seriously impaired 
by CTG. The activist disclosed that a refugee whom he was 
assisting was forced to pay $10,000 to the Eritrean Consulate 
to secure an exit visa for his wife. “If that money were here, 
that person could have used that money to invest in building 
his skills or use it as a down payment for his home, which 
takes him away from being a burden to Canadian society. Or 
the money can also be used for the Canadian community, for 
that matter. So, you see the impact is so great.”
Most participants were separated from their loved ones 
for a number of years. For the sake of their families and their 
loved ones who lived in the grip of the Eritrean regime, three 
participants fulfilled the demands of the consulate. They 
paid 2 percent of their annual income and donated money to 
military defence to get exit visas for their family and secure 
their educational documents from Eritrea.
Some refugees get exit visas for their family after their 
payments to the Eritrean regime. However, many partici-
pants believe that that does not work for everyone. They do 
not receive any guarantee from the Eritrean regime. The 
interviewees spoke of the risks they were forced to take, to 
get their families out of Eritrea by human smugglers, a physi-
cally and psychologically stressful, expensive, and dangerous 
enterprise. Yohannes entered Canada in 2008 and claimed 
for refugee status inland. He said, “In the last eight years that 
I have stayed here, I have spent more money to pay for their 
escape than what I spent to feed them while they were in 
Eritrea. You are forced to spend your four-year income for 
such a purpose because there is no other choice. It drains 
you financially and leaves you without any money. I was 
forced to pay US$20,000 to the smugglers.”
The experience of Belay is similar. He came in 2006, leav-
ing his family behind, and claimed refugee status when he 
entered Canada. He had just finished his graduate studies 
and began working on contract. Despite his dire financial 
situation, he had to do anything to reunite with his family 
before things got worse in Eritrea. He noted, “I didn’t have 
enough money to meet all my financial needs. So, what I 
did, I had to ask my friends and relatives for credit because I 
can’t finance it with my credit card. I have to have cash, so I 
have to rely on friends and relatives who wish to reunite me 
with my family.” He reunited with his family after four years 
of separation. Still, he could have paid off his student debt 
and gotten better housing if he wasn’t forced to spend it on 
getting his family to join him. The tremendous amount of 
money that refugees are forced to pay the Eritrean consulate 
or smugglers to unite with their family is a real drain on their 
resources. This money could have been used to ease their 
financial challenges instead.
In 2015, after the Eritrean consulate had refused to assist 
Yohannes unless he paid the 2 per cent tax on his income. He 
noted, “When I decided to bring my family out, I just took 
a 50 percent chance, either to smuggle them successfully or 
lose them. There are soldiers who patrol the border day and 
night. If the smugglers try to smuggle them out while the 
army is on duty, they can be killed. The other thing is the 
issue of smugglers. You have no idea whether they are inde-
pendent or whether they work for the government. So they 
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can take your money and not bring your family or they can 
sell them to other smugglers. The risks are huge.”
Likewise, Belay spoke of the dangers that threatens his 
psychological state: “The whole process was psychologically 
traumatic both for my family and me. The effect has long-
term consequences. I was in a constant state of psychological 
turmoil and stress, which lasted for a very long time. In fact, 
it can affect not just your health and psychological well-
being, but also that of your family.”
The risks these refugees took to reunite with their family 
are enormous. They put the lives of their loved ones in great 
danger to secure their ultimate safety. There was no guar-
antee of finding a safe way to escape from Eritrea, but that 
was the only option they believed they had. In the process, 
they were prepared to suffer psychologically, become broke 
financially, and pay any price to bring their family and restart 
their life in Canada. Unfortunately, the path of restarting a 
new life is not easy for most, as a result of the psychologi-
cal trauma they experience as a result of tackling such great 
odds. 
Fear and Isolation
Participants expressed a number of fears: safety of family 
members in Eritrea; safety of their passage to Canada; and 
the threatening presence of CTG in their lives in Canada, 
through the acts of the consulate and suspected community 
collaborators. 
All participants believe that any activity they engage in 
Canada can negatively affect the fate of their family. They 
do not feel free or secure to reject or criticize the demands 
of the Eritrean consulate in Toronto, despite the protec-
tion they are provided by the Canadian government. The 
words of Yohannes are typical and reflect the isolation that 
results from mutual suspicion generated by the fear: “The 
office asks every individual to pay the 2 per cent tax, donate 
money, and the worst thing is the fear they have instilled in 
many Eritreans who live here. This makes all Eritreans suspi-
cious of one another.” Russom stated that the main targets 
of the consulate are refugees: “They were taking advantage 
of refugees, especially refugees because they know that we 
have left people we love behind … I cannot oppose what the 
Consulate is doing.” As a result of this threat, many Eritrean 
refugees live in a state of fear for their family members who 
still live in Eritrea. Since those refugees do not know how 
the system can protect them, they censor their conversations 
and activities and restrain themselves from complaining to 
Canadian law enforcement agencies for fear of retaliation to 
their loved ones by the Eritrean government. Even though 
they live in a presumably free and democratic society, they 
do not feel liberated. 
The fear and intimidation of the Eritrean regime are per-
vasive. Feruz immigrated to Canada in 2010 to join her fam-
ily. She said, “They threaten the people not to express their 
voice against the Eritrean government and force them to pay 
2 per cent of their income.” 
Samuel, a refugee in Canada since 2007, consolidated 
Feruz’s points by sharing his own story in the second week of 
his arrival. He was invited to attend a meeting in the church 
and was disturbed by what he heard: “The guest speaker was 
… the Eritrean consul. His speech gave me nightmares about 
the brutality of the Eritrean regime. It continues even here. 
When I left the meeting, I cried all the way home. What he 
was saying was that everyone has to be up-to-date in paying 
the 2 per cent tax, and every household has to pay $500 to 
fund the Eritrean defence forces.” Samuel said that the Eri-
trean consulate interfered in the business of the community 
centre that provides settlement services to newcomers:
The concern I have with the consulate is that they mix their consu-
lar business with the community groups, which are supposed to be 
non-partisan and non-divisive, focusing on the settlement needs 
of newcomers. To Canadians, the Canadian government, and the 
media, these groups look like communities from outside, but they 
are politically polarized; they use different tactics in isolating peo-
ple who speak up about what happened to them under the regime. 
The consulate also spreads rumours to scare and control others 
who might follow the same path. They use scare tactics to threaten 
to retaliate against family and refuse to provide services that are 
meant for all newcomers. Instead, they only assist those who are 
loyal to the regime.
Front and centre of those refugees’ fear is their loved ones. 
They do not want their family members to be punished by 
the Eritrean government for disobeying the Eritrean consu-
late in Canada. They do not want their issues to end up in 
the public domain so that the Eritrean regime could retaliate 
against their loved ones. Those refugees do not see a shield 
of Canadian police that can protect them from this coercive 
transnational governance.
Refugees’ fears were compounded by the resultant isola-
tion. What prevents most Eritrean refugees from reporting 
their complaints to Canadian law enforcement agents is fear 
of repercussions. They are afraid to testify or act as witnesses 
for the police because of their loved ones who live in their 
country of origin. Refugees say that their family members 
can be tortured, arrested, or forced to pay hefty money as a 
reprisal. Meanwhile, Canadian law enforcement agents will 
always need the cooperation of the victims to push cases 
forward and resolve issues. Agents may guarantee the safety 
of refugees in their jurisdiction, but not their families who 
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live outside Canada. Participants in this research know this 
and that is why they do not come forward to seek help. So 
they will remain fearful and isolated victims of CTG until the 
Canadian law enforcement agents figure out how to handle it.
Problems with Reporting CTG to Authorities
There is great lack of trust in the way police work in less 
developed and post-authoritarian countries.52 Immigrants 
who came from those regions tend to distrust police after 
their previous bad experiences and may not initially 
approach police for help. However, this was not an issue for 
the participants in this research. Instead, five participants 
did not seek help or file complaints with Canadian law 
enforcement agents out of fear of retaliation on their loved 
ones by the Eritrean regime. Ghebru, who found his way to 
Canada via the United States to claim asylum in 2008 said, “I 
and many others prefer to keep quiet because, for any action 
that is taken by me or someone like me here, our parents 
will eventually pay the price. They will get detained and have 
to pay a hefty amount of money. This is practised widely in 
Eritrea and, unfortunately, for that reason, many who have 
loved ones in Eritrea prefer to keep silent.” 
The police officers interviewed declared that matters can 
be handled confidentially, although one of them also noted 
that victims would need further assistance to push cases for-
ward. He noted, “Your complaints are a confidential matter 
between you and the police. If you complain about someone 
who is intimidating you and harassing you, the police can 
go to them to hear that person’s side of their story too. We 
realize it is a difficult situation. The best thing to do in these 
circumstances is to take notes about what happened to you, 
why you think it happened, who did it, and present that to 
the police. You can go to any police station in Toronto.” 
Belay noted that in addition to fear, lack of knowledge of 
the Canadian system could be an issue for some refugees, a 
sentiment that was echoed by the community activist: “The 
problem lies with the mentality of some of our people. So 
far, they haven’t been really liberated, partly because some of 
them do not know that the law exists to protect them.” 
However, three refugees had taken their issues to the RCMP 
and police, but they were not always happy with the results. 
Russom reported his experiences to a police station, only to 
stop his case because he was told that they could do noth-
ing because he had not been “forced to pay.” This suggests 
that the way the RCMP or police handle the complaints may 
discourage Eritrean refugees from coming forward. Nei-
ther officer interviewed could talk about specific issues and 
instead pointed to standard procedures. How informed are 
police about the transnational nature of community politics, 
harassment, intimidation, and the controversial fundraising 
activities? As the demography of the country changes rapidly 
as well as the nature of crimes, law enforcement officers may 
have some catching up to do to deal with immigrants’ issues. 
To simplify the way refugees report their concerns or file 
their complaints, it is crucial to have a specific unit or at least 
contact persons in the law enforcement agencies who under-
stand the complexities of the refugees’ issues. Otherwise, 
refugees will keep suffering because law enforcement agents 
do not understand their issues. Most of all, the CTG will keep 
undermining Canadian law by imposing rules on citizens of 
Eritrean origin. Those refugees are forced to donate money 
for Eritrean military activities, despite the fact that it is ille-
gal in Canada. The actions of the Eritrean regime violate 
international law, undermining Canadian sovereignty, and 
worst of all, committing crimes against helpless refugees. 
This cannot be resolved by the local law enforcement agents, 
but by addressing the issue on the higher level—senior offi-
cials of the Canadian government with senior officials of the 
Eritrean government.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Canada has become home for thousands of Eritrean refugees 
who were forced to leave their country of origin because of 
war, colonialism, and political instability. Eritrean refugees 
face obstacles during their settlement process in Canada, 
including the language barrier, financial challenges, discrim-
ination, and lack of employment. However, to make matters 
worse, unlike other African immigrants, their journey to a 
new life in Canada is jeopardized because of the coercive 
transnational governance of their home country. This new 
term was coined to accurately describe a practice that has 
been identified by other researchers regarding Eritrean 
regime. 
In addition to contributing to the terminology of the sub-
ject matter, this article also aims to illustrate the impact of 
CTG on refugees’ lives. Eleven people were recruited for this 
research, including eight Eritrean refugees who arrived in 
Canada in the last 20 years, one community activist, and two 
law enforcement officers. 
The findings clearly confirm the issues raised regarding the 
role of the Eritrean regime in controlling the lives of its people 
in diaspora, while giving a voice to the refugees themselves 
about the impact of those acts. The Eritrean consulate in 
Toronto creates insurmountable hurdles for Eritrean refugees 
in the initial stages of their settlement by instilling fear, by dan-
gling its consular services for a payment of 2 per cent income 
tax and drying up the financial resources of Eritrean refugees. 
The participants shared a rocky transition to a new life. Their 
personal lives are put on hold by withdrawal of documents 
that they could use to establish a better start or to enjoy mobil-
ity to tend to their affairs. Their family lives are on hold as well, 
with many risking the dangers of human smuggling when the 
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exit visas of spouses and children from Eritrea are refused. 
The monetary and psychological costs that arise from these 
stresses created by the Eritrean regime are enormous. 
One major barrier that all participants experienced dur-
ing their settlement process was fear instilled by the Eritrean 
consulate, which effectively silenced the refugees’ critical 
voices, because the consulate interfered and spied upon their 
activities and punished family members of any exiled per-
son who spoke against the Eritrean government. Despite the 
presumed protection granted by the Canadian government, 
participants lived in constant fear of the regime that was 
trying to govern them from afar. Fear for the lives of family 
members prevents refugees from contacting Canadian law 
enforcement bodies, and those who do are frustrated by the 
unhelpful responses that further discourage people from 
coming forward. 
The findings reveal that the Eritrean consulate is the cause 
of the rough transition and integration process of Eritrean 
refugees in Canada. Our research demonstrates that the con-
sulate uses the facade of a legal office to interfere in the settle-
ment and integration process of refugees by applying coercive 
transnational governance and undermining Canadian law. 
This undermines Canadian sovereignty, as the consulate dic-
tates the lives of Eritrean refugees who will become Canadian 
citizens. Since the notion of a sovereign state is the freedom 
from interference by foreign sources or powers, the coercive 
transnational practices of the Eritrean government and busi-
nesses pose a challenge to Canadian sovereignty, interfering 
with the lives on its soil, of a group of people who are either 
citizens or future citizens. The government of Canada respects 
Eritrean sovereignty while objecting to—but not interfering 
with—matters internal to Eritrea. This is an unbalanced rela-
tionship in which Canada’s government has to take charge to 
re-establish its sovereignty by putting a stop to unacceptable 
and illegal acts that jeopardize its population.
Recommendations
Several major issues and associated recommendations result 
from this study to alleviate the challenges of Eritrean refu-
gees and secure Canadian sovereignty. Although the sample 
of this study is small, the refugees’ experiences analyzed here 
suggest specific issues and point to possible solutions:
1. The major issue is that Eritrean refugees face financial 
decimation and general hardship in their lives, due to 
the payments demanded by representatives of the Eri-
trean government in their countries of exile. As a solu-
tion, a specific unit or at least a contact person could 
be designated by the Canadian government that allows 
refugees to file their complaints easily whenever they 
are threatened, receive demands to pay money, or are 
ordered to become involved in activities against their 
will by the government of their home country or its 
representatives. 
2. A related issue is that Eritrean refugees feel threatened 
by their former country of origin, do not feel that they 
are protected by Canadian government officials, and 
do not know who to turn to when they have difficulties 
with the Eritrean government and its representatives. 
There are a number of areas where this issue needs to 
be addressed:
• The primary area is the need for government action. 
The Canadian government must address the con-
cerns of Canadian citizens of Eritrean origin with 
the Eritrean government on a higher level and end 
the practice of the regime that undermines Cana-
dian sovereignty and threatens citizens’ safety. These 
complaints and concerns should also be officially 
conveyed at the international level, to the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 
• A related issue is the education of newcomers about 
their rights and duties in Canada, and how the 
law enforcement agents operate to protect them. 
A related point is that those who are victimized by 
CTG should be given specific protection, to encour-
age them to come forward to make complaints. 
• Similarly, community service agencies and law 
enforcement agents should be educated about the spe-
cific needs and complex challenges of the refugee pop-
ulations they serve. In this area, they should be made 
aware of the oppressive practices of dictatorial regimes 
and their use of consulate offices or individuals. 
3. A further area of concern is lack of knowledge about the 
specific coercive practices of oppressive regimes against 
their former citizens abroad. To this end, there is need 
to promote and fund research on coercive transna-
tional governance and experiences of certain groups of 
nationalities. Our small-scale study highlights the need 
to listen to the experiences of refugees and to follow up 
with larger-scale studies to identify and address their 
challenges. It is only by expanding this knowledge base 
that governments, community organizations, and law 
enforcement agencies can be convinced of the needs of 
specific refugee populations. Further research is needed 
on Eritrean and other populations facing CTG, to estab-
lish the prevalence of these different practices, and their 
consequences on the populations, including impacts on 
individuals and families. 
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